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SOCRATES IN THE STOA 
 
 
According to Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers, an unbroken 
chain of teachers and pupils links Socrates to the earliest Stoics (I 15).  The 
founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, is said to have studied with Crates (VI 
105 and VII 2), who is supposed to have absorbed Cynicism from Diogenes 
of Sinope (VI 85 and 87), and Diogenes, in turn, reportedly earned the label 
"Cynic" under the influence of Antisthenes (VI 21), who is called a follower of 
Socrates (VI 2).  Ancient philosophical biographies show a fondness for 
teacher-pupil successions of this sort, and historical facts did not always get 
in the way.  Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the point that motivates 
this particular succession: Socrates influenced Stoicism profoundly.   
Stoics manifested their debt to Socrates in two distinctive ways.  First, 
Stoics embrace paradoxical doctrines in the style of Socrates, and indeed, 
they embrace many of Socrates' own paradoxes.  Cicero saw this clearly, 
averring that "most of the surprising so-called paradoxa of the Stoics are 
Socratic" (Acad. 2.136).  When Cicero wrote The Paradoxes of the Stoics to 
show how his rhetorical skill could make Stoic paradoxes plausible to a 
general audience, he concentrated on six of the "most Socratic" (Parad. 4) 
theses: only the fine is good, virtue suffices for happiness, vicious actions 
are equal and virtuous actions are equal, everyone who is not a sage is 
insane, only the sage is free, and only the sage is rich.  Cicero's purposes do 
not include explaining the Socratic provenance of these paradoxes, and 
many scholars today would balk at his list.  No one denies that paradoxical 
doctrines link Socrates to the Stoics, but most scholars prefer to attribute 
different paradoxes to both Socrates and the Stoics: no one does wrong 
willingly and all virtue is one.   
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A second way in which the Stoics pledge allegiance to Socrates is by 
invoking him as an example to imitate.  Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, 
and Marcus Aurelius—all prominent Stoics in the time of the Roman 
Empire—do this.   (None did this more than Epictetus; see the next chapter.)  
The record is less clear for earlier Greek Stoics, whose writing is almost all 
lost.  The evidence of interest in Socrates is perfectly clear: the second head 
of the school, Cleanthes (331-232 BCE) cites Socrates for the view that 
advantage is not severed from what is just (Clement SVF 1.558); the 
obscure third-century BCE Stoics Zeno of Sidon and Theon of Antiochia each 
wrote an Apology of Socrates (Suda s.v. = SSR I C 505); another third-
century BCE Stoic named Sphaerus wrote a work titled On Lycurgus and 
Socrates in three books (D.L. VII 178); Antipater of Tarsus, a second-
century BCE head of the school, invoked Socrates in his book On Anger 
(Athenaeus SVF 3.65 Antipater) and collected Socrates' remarkable 
divinations (Cicero, Div. I 123); and Panaetius (185-109 BCE) defended 
Socrates from the charges of bigamy frequently made by Peripatetics 
(Plutarch, Aristides 335c-d = fr. 152 van Straaten).  Still, it is not clear how 
much of this evidence shows that Socrates was taken to be an example 
worth imitating.  It is not nearly as clear as the evidence for the much later 
Roman Stoics, or even for Posidonius (c. 135-c. 50 BCE), who numbered 
Socrates alongside Diogenes the Cynic and the proto-Cynic Antisthenes 
among those who had made progress (D.L. VII 91 = fr. 29 Edelstein-Kidd).  
From the relative silence of the historical record, one might infer that 
the earliest Stoics did not invoke Socrates as an example.  But arguments 
from silence, rarely powerful, are especially weak when the record is 
meager.  Moreover, early Greek Stoics share the commitments that lead 
later Roman Stoics to invoke Socrates as an example.  For example: the 
third Stoic scholarch Chrysippus of Soli (280-206 BCE), like Seneca (c. 1-65 
CE), wrote "protreptic" works to encourage a philosophical way of life, and 
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like Seneca, he concerned himself with the part of ethics "concerning 
appropriate actions, recommendations and warnings" (D.L. VII 84; cf. 
Sextus M. VII 12) that Stoics called the "paraenetic" or "perceptive" part 
(Seneca, Ep. 95.1: parainetikos topos or pars praeceptiva, from Greek and 
Latin words for 'rule').  But Chrysippus, again like Seneca, recognized the 
limited value of rules in encouraging progress toward a fully philosophical 
way of life, and it seems that he, still like Seneca, endorsed the political life 
of a king in part because of the value that a king could have as an example 
for citizens to imitate.  So it is quite easy to suppose that Chrysippus and his 
fellow Greek Stoics in the third century BCE agreed with the later Stoics 
(Tranq. 5.2, Ben. V 6.1-7) and the rest that Socrates was a model worth 
imitating.  At the very least, it is far easier than imagining who else an early 
Stoic might have proposed, and Socrates was widely thought (by, e.g., 
Xenophon, Mem. I 2.2-3) to have improved others' lives by serving as an 
example for them to imitate.  So although skepticism about early Stoic 
invocation of Socrates as an exemplar is possible, it seems more prudent to 
suppose that even the earliest Stoics manifested their Socratic inheritance in 
two ways.     
A Stoic, however, might well find something wrong with distinguishing 
these two ways, for it is unlikely that any Stoic encountered the Socratic 
paradoxes as a matter of theory, entirely cut off from Socrates' own life.  
After all, Socrates did not commit any of his theorizing about the paradoxes 
to writing, and the writings about Socrates portray him in action and thereby 
connect what he says (including his paradoxes) with his way of life.  This 
suggests that reflection on what Socrates did led the Stoics to hold him up 
as an example to imitate and to endorse the Socratic paradoxes.  So 
understood, there is just one inheritance, the gift of Socrates' way of life.  
On this way of looking at things, there is also something wrong with 
scouring particular texts to distinguish between the Stoic paradoxes that 
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"really are" Socratic and those that are not.  The question for each of the 
paradoxes is, did the Stoics arrive at this by reflecting on what Socrates did?  
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered by looking at the Stoic 
writings.  In part, this is due to the paucity of early Stoic writings, and in 
part, it is due to the kind of evidence we have for Stoic views, since we do 
not possess much of any Stoic's intellectual autobiography.  Still, we can 
answer the related question, could the Stoics have arrived easily at their 
paradoxes by reflecting on what Socrates did?  We can do this by reflecting 
for ourselves on what Socrates did and by testing how easily these 
reflections point in the direction of Stoic paradoxes.   
This is the task of this chapter.  I will demonstrate how reflection on 
Socrates' way of life leads not only to the so-called "prudential paradox" (no 
one does wrong willingly) and the unity of virtue but also to the six theses 
that Cicero highlights.  Then, to test my hypothesis, I will also consider the 
ways in which the Stoics qualified their enthusiasm for Socrates' life, and I 
will argue that these qualifications, too, can be connected to deep reflection 
on what Socrates did.  My primary aim is to explain the Stoics' Socratic 
inheritance.  But I also hope to vindicate Cicero against the current scholars 
and to cast new light on Socrates.  I pin these hopes on a simple fact: the 
way Socrates lived expresses philosophical commitments that are there to 
be articulated by anyone who examines his life, whether Socrates himself, or 
Plato, or Antisthenes, or a Stoic.  This is why the question of which 
paradoxes are Socratic cannot be settled by reference to what Socrates 
managed to see upon self-examination, much less by reference to what 
some character called Socrates says in someone else's dialogue.  And it is 
why Stoicism enlarges our awareness not just of what philosophy can be, 
but also of what Socrates, the Greek and Roman ancients' philosopher par 
excellence, was. 
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From Socrates' Life to Stoic Paradoxes 
 
The stories about Socrates reveal a single central commitment: to 
examine lives, his own and others'.  He sought to examine lives himself, and 
he exhorted others to do so, as well.  Reflection on this commitment leads 
easily to the Stoa if we note four further features of Socrates' way of life.  
First, Socrates preferred to examine lives by question-and-answer.  He 
did not typically offer long speeches with worked-out theories for others to 
accept or reject; instead, he asked others questions about their 
commitments.  This characteristic method inspired the genre of Socratic 
dialogues, and it hardly escaped the Stoics' notice.  Book III of Chrysippus' 
On Dialectic, for example, insists that question-and-answer argument was 
important to many previous philosophers, including "especially" Socrates 
(Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1045f-1046a).   
Although this feature of Socrates' life does not lead immediately to 
Stoic paradox, it does suggest three important points.  First, because 
Socrates asks questions with the aim of examining lives, he has good reason 
to focus his queries on the commitments that affect the shape of those lives.  
And so he apparently did: in the surviving Socratic dialogues, he targets the 
"most important things," asking about how to live.  The Stoics should notice 
this, too, but it is available to them to disagree with Socrates about what 
things count as most important, about what commitments are essential to 
living.  As we shall see, many Stoics did disagree with Socrates on this 
score.   
Second, if Socrates expected his method to be able to deliver a full 
examination, he must have thought that (at least) the fundamental moving 
and shaping attitudes of one's life are (at least potentially) accessible to one.  
Socrates is less often depicted reflecting on this point, but he was surely 
committed to it.  For if dialectic is sufficient to examine a life, either there 
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are no inaccessibly unconscious drives, or they make no significant 
difference to life.  Of course, Socrates can concede that at least some people 
are sometimes unable to recognize some of their commitments.  Indeed, he 
can say of them what we might: that they are in denial.  But he can also and 
must insist that their failure to know themselves does not preclude the 
possibility of self-knowledge.  So a Socratic does not yet have to outrage all 
common sense.  But outrage is coming, for the accessibility of our 
motivating attitudes is crucial to the paradox that no one errs willingly.   
Finally, Socrates' commitment to examining lives suggests that there 
is something good, in general, about examining one's life and, in particular, 
about engaging in question-and-answer to examine one's life.  (Why else 
would he be so committed to it?)  Unsurprisingly, then, Socrates is regularly 
portrayed avowing the deep importance of the examined life.  But this point 
raises a question: what exactly is the good that Socrates' dialectical 
examination offers? 
To answer this question, we should introduce a second feature of 
Socrates' examinations, namely, their results.  These are typically negative: 
Socrates regularly showed that the examined person did not have a 
consistent set of commitments.  Sometimes, however, negative results are 
good.  In this case, it is plausible that identifying bad things is good—it at 
least makes the avoidance or elimination of bad things easier—and plausible 
that inconsistencies in one's commitments about how to live are bad.  
Inconsistency in one's commitments is bad in at least two ways.  First, 
inconsistency undermines justification.  If, for example, Euthyphro has 
inconsistent attitudes about piety, then he cannot justify prosecuting his 
father against the charge that the prosecution is impious.  Second, 
inconsistency threatens the smooth flow of one's life.  In part, this second 
problem piggybacks on the first.  Imagine that other people object to 
something that I want to do.  If I cannot justify my desired course of action, 
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then how smooth will my life be?  Surely it will not be smooth if I have to 
bend the others to my aims, or be bent by them.  Nor is opting for fraud in 
place of force a guarantee of calm waters ahead.  Nor can I easily quit 
human society to duck the whole problem, for even if the practical difficulties 
of solo life were easily surmountable, it is likely that I want to live with some 
other human beings, and so the mere temptation to leave would be just 
another manifestation of my inconsistency.  As this already suggests, 
inconsistency threatens not just a socially smooth life, but also a 
psychologically smooth one, but the psychological difficulties of inconsistency 
extend far beyond any social problems.  If I have inconsistent attitudes 
about how much coffee I should drink, for example, then I am subject to 
psychological conflict, and I cannot satisfy all my attitudes about coffee (and 
temperance and nutrition and the rest).  There will be dissatisfactions—
bumps—in my experience of life.  
Zeno of Citium and his followers characterized the human good as a 
smooth flow of life (Stobaeus II 7.6e 77,20-21 Wachsmuth; cf. Diogenes 
Laertius VII 88 and Sextus M. XI 30), and so these considerations are very 
close to central Stoic doctrines.  But we need a third feature of Socrates' life 
to reach the eight paradoxes highlighted above.  So let us notice that 
Socrates examined others not just for the negative result of uncovering 
inconsistency.  He also aimed for a positive result: he sought wisdom or 
knowledge.  If we notice this fact—and who could fail to notice it while 
characterizing Socrates as a lover of wisdom—and if we take Socrates to be 
a model, then we must think that his dialectical work can, at least in 
principle, lead to knowledge.  Nor is this is an unreasonable thought.  We 
have already seen that Socratic examination can reach all of one's primary 
motivating commitments and can bring inconsistencies to light.  So dialectic 
can at least minimize inconsistencies in one's motivating attitudes.  In fact, 
it can do more.  Socrates typically exposed inconsistencies by questioning 
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the inferential relations among the examinee's commitments.  So any set of 
commitments that survives Socratic dialectic must exhibit not only mere 
consistency but also some measure of coherence.  We can make sense of 
how Socratic dialectic aims at knowledge by conceiving of knowledge in 
terms of coherent psychological commitments.   
The Stoics did conceive knowledge as a coherent set of psychological 
attitudes.  They say that knowledge is a "cognitive grasp" (katalêpsis) or a 
system of cognitive grasps (also called an "art" or "expertise," i.e., technê) 
that is "stable, firm, and unshakeable by reason or argument (logos)" 
(Stobaeus II 7.5l 73,19-74,1; D.L. VII 47; Sextus M. VII 151; Pseudo-Galen 
SVF 2.93; Philo SVF 2.95; and cf. Cicero, Acad. I 41-42, who attributes this 
account of knowledge to Zeno).  Central to this definition is the idea that one 
who knows cannot be forced in a dialectical argument to give up something 
that he takes himself to know and cannot be led by a dialectical argument to 
assent to anything that contradicts with what he takes himself to know.  The 
Stoic conception of knowledge neatly expresses the positive aim of surviving 
Socratic dialectic.     
It also raises difficult questions because it seems to many philosophers 
clear enough that a person could have a coherent set of false beliefs.  The 
evidence suggests that Socrates himself did not worry about this objection, 
for it appears that Socrates did not concern himself with what knowledge is.  
Perhaps he just assumed that we have enough common sense to retain at 
least some true beliefs that would guarantee the truth of all the 
commitments in a fully coherent set.  Those whom Socrates influenced 
developed different ways of bolstering this assumption.  Plato, for example, 
at least entertained the thought that our souls are naturally geared to the 
truth by their disembodied experiences before our lifetimes.  The Stoics, by 
contrast, insisted that we are naturally situated in such a way that at least 
some of our experiences of the world are veridical; they insist that someone 
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who knows has not only perfect mastery of dialectical arguments but also 
perfect reliability in assent to sense-impressions.    
But the finer points of these epistemological reflections on the Socratic 
way of life are unnecessary to explain the Stoic paradoxes.  Once a Stoic 
embraces psychological coherence as the positive goal of Socratic 
examination, four of the eight paradoxes are near to hand.  Since 
psychological coherence is knowledge, those who have incoherent 
(inconsistent or underdeveloped) commitments are ignorant.  It also seems 
reasonable that virtue or excellence characterizes those who know and vice 
or defect characterizes those who are ignorant.  Does this mean that 
excellence characterizes everything that a knower does, and vice 
characterizes everything that an ignorant person does?  Yes, if we recall the 
accessibility of motivating attitudes.  The person who knows has no 
conflicting attitudes, conscious or not.  So when she judges that such-and-
such is excellent to do in these circumstances, she has no motivation to 
conflict with doing such-and-such.  There is no way to explain how the 
virtuous could fail to do what she judges to be excellent.  And since the 
virtuous have knowledge, this result means that the excellent cannot fail to 
do what is, in fact, excellent.  On the other hand, the person who is ignorant 
is doomed to act in defective ways.  Even if he does something that is 
describable in the same terms as what the excellent person would do, we 
nevertheless cannot say that the ignorant person does something excellent 
because the excellence of an action depends upon the reasons for which it is 
done, and the ignorant person's reasons are defective.        
We are now playing with paradoxes.  First, note that all excellent 
actions are excellent by virtue of the agent's whole coherent psychology.  
Actions are not just or temperate by virtue of some limited set of judgments 
or affective conditions: the same full set of attitudes makes this action just 
and that action temperate.  So the conditions that cause just and temperate 
  10 
actions—justice and temperance, respectively—are the same coherent state 
of the soul.  This is the paradox of the unity of virtue.  The paradox need not 
imply that there are no distinctions among the virtues.  A Stoic can and 
some did distinguish by saying that some judgments (or "theorems") are 
primary in just actions and others primary in temperate actions (D.L. VII 
125-126; Stobaeus II 7.5b5 63,6-25 Wachsmuth).  But there was 
controversy over this point (see Schofield 1984).  The third-century (BCE) 
renegade Ariston of Chios denied that a coherent psychology would make 
judgments in the form of "general theorems" about value (Seneca, Ep. 89.13 
and 94.2; and Sextus, M. VII 12), and so he also denied that there are 
grounds to distinguish among the virtues, except in relation (e.g., D.L. VII 
161).  He urged a more radical understanding of the thesis that virtue is 
one.  This seems to have been a dispute about how to understand the 
Socratic point that the virtues are all one and the same; similar disputes 
occasioned by Ariston will be considered below.  
Next, recall the point that actions done from psychological coherence 
are virtuous and actions done without psychological coherence are vicious, 
and add the assumption that there are no degrees of coherence.  (This new 
assumption is reasonable enough: either one's psychology is in harmony or 
it is not.)  We now can say that all virtuous actions are equally virtuous and 
all vicious actions are equally vicious, and this gives a point to the paradox 
that all vicious actions are equal and all virtuous actions are equal.  As with 
the unity of virtue, this paradox is compatible with some distinctions.  A 
Stoic can admit that there are grounds for praising some virtuous actions 
more than others or for blaming some vicious actions more than others 
(Cicero, Fin. III 48; cf. Parad. 20).  Indeed, a Stoic should admit this insofar 
as the commitments that are built into a coherent psychology will 
themselves generally prefer some virtuous actions to others and will 
generally prefer to restrain some vicious actions more than others.  The 
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Stoic will insist, however, that all virtuous actions are equally virtuous and 
all vicious actions are equally vicious.  
Another of Cicero's paradoxes follows if we add the reasonable 
assumption that psychological coherence is a model of health.  For now we 
can say that everyone who fails to be wise will fall short of the standard for 
mental health, and that gives us reason to say that everyone who fails to be 
wise is insane.  Again, the paradox can be understood in a way that renders 
it false.  The Stoics are not saying that a lack of wisdom is indistinguishable 
from, say, paranoid schizophrenia.  They are simply drawing out a Socratic 
lesson in a particularly pointed way. 
Finally, since excellent actions are all and only those done by the 
knowing and vicious actions are all and only those done by the ignorant, no 
one does wrong knowingly, and this sustains the prudential paradox that no 
one does wrong willingly.  Again, though, there is potential confusion.  The 
Stoic does not maintain that wrong-doing is always involuntary or free from 
blame.  Rather, the Stoic insists that someone who knows what she is doing 
would never do wrong.  By putting the point in terms of "willingness," the 
Stoics invite the confusion, but they are nevertheless drawing attention to a 
perfectly natural sense of acting willingly, the sense in which everyone wills 
to act while knowing what one is doing.  Nor are the Stoics simply sliding 
from a quotidian sense of "knowing what one is doing" to a demanding 
sense.  When we act from ignorance, we act from an incoherent psychology: 
we have conflicting or underdeveloped attitudes.  But no one wants 
conflicting or underdeveloped attitudes, at least not as such.  When we act, 
we will to do what we do, and not to undermine or under-support it.  But on 
the Stoics' Socratic analysis, wrong actions cannot be willed in this 
wholehearted, integrated way.  
Four of the Stoic paradoxes have now emerged from reflection on the 
Socratic way of life, and in particular from reflection on knowledge as the 
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psychological coherence sought by Socrates' examinations.  The remaining 
four paradoxes depend upon reflection on a fourth feature of Socrates' life: 
his zealous commitment to examining lives.  It is a standard part of the 
picture of Socrates that he was on a mission.  He did not let other interests 
get in the way, and he did not back down when his examinations discomfited 
those around him, not even when he faced death.  This should suggest to a 
Stoic reflecting on Socrates' life that there is nothing comparable to the 
activity of examining lives, nothing for which one might trade it.  The Stoic 
might naturally express this by saying that only philosophical activity is 
good, that everything else has at best an incomparably different kind of 
value.  But this thought needs to be brought together with our earlier 
reflections on knowledge and excellence.  Surely the philosophical activity 
that is good is not done from ignorance but from knowledge: it is excellent, 
virtuous activity.  And so the Stoic is led to the thought that only virtuous 
activity is good.   
This introduces another paradox: only the fine is good.  Stoics refine 
this thought by insisting that only virtue itself is, strictly speaking, good, 
since only virtue has the causal power of benefiting.  On this view, virtuous 
actions, virtuous persons, and virtuous collections of persons (cities, say) 
are good in a looser sense because virtue benefits through them (Stobaeus 
II 7.5d 69,17-70,3; Sextus M. XI 25-26; and the textually problematic D.L. 
VII 94).  This paradox, too, can lead to misunderstanding.  For if only virtue 
is good, one might think that there is no reason to go for things like health 
and wealth.  Indeed, Stoics maintain that such things are not by themselves 
beneficial for us; rather, the excellent use of them is beneficial, and the 
foolish use of them is harmful.  So they—as opposed to their use—are 
indifferent to our flourishing.  But that is not to say that they are entirely 
indifferent to us: according to most Stoics—Ariston of Chios is the prominent 
exception—health, wealth, and the like naturally stimulate us to pursue 
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them.  Similarly, other people who are not virtuous are indifferent to our 
flourishing, but not entirely indifferent to us, since we are naturally 
stimulated to care for other human beings.  Still, the Stoics do not consider 
health, wealth, and the concerns of others to be goods under another name.  
When a Stoic goes for health or seeks to help her brother, she is merely 
preferring health and merely preferring to see her brother aided.  She does 
not see any good in health or in her brother's condition, and she will not be 
troubled if she fails to achieve health or help for her brother.  Her true aim is 
to go for health or seek to help her brother virtuously.  Her natural 
inclinations for health, wealth, the concerns of others, and the rest are 
sensitive to the circumstances, and when she chooses the best action 
available to her, she locates her good in nothing but choosing the best action 
available to her in the circumstances.     
Two more paradoxes enter as consequences of the Stoic sage's perfect 
grasp of what is good.  First, only the sage is free.  Deep attraction to things 
other than one's own virtue leave one enslaved to fortune, and even 
imperfect apprehension that only virtue is good leaves one vulnerable, 
because one's imperfect judgments are weak and "shakeable."  But the sage 
is truly free of fortune's effects.  Of course, this freedom that the sage 
enjoys does not guarantee political freedom, or even freedom from chattel 
slavery; the Stoics thought that even a chattel slave could and should 
philosophize (Philo SVF 3.352 and Lactantius 3.253 with Athenaeus SVF 
3.353).  Second, only the sage is rich.  Because the sage alone enjoys what 
is genuinely good, the sage alone has real wealth, real accumulated value.  
Of course, the sage's wealth does not guarantee a large amount of money; 
the Stoics, unlike so many other Greek philosophers, do not think that one 
has to be financially well-off to live well.  
Finally, the exclusive goodness of virtue leads to the paradox that 
virtue suffices for happiness.  Happiness is just the name for a life lived well 
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with enjoyment of goods.  But for the Stoics, there are no goods except for 
virtue, and so there is nothing to living well with enjoyment of goods except 
living virtuously.    
 
Taking Exception with Socrates   
 
Reflection on Socrates' way of life leads to Cicero's six Stoic paradoxes 
and the two frequently mentioned by modern scholars.  In fact, the 
connections between Socrates' way of life and fundamental tenets of 
Stoicism are so deep that one might wonder why the Stoics did not 
recommend living exactly as Socrates did.  Before closing, then, I will 
consider three ways in which Stoics qualified their enthusiasm for Socrates. 
 One charge of disagreement needs to be quieted, however.  It is 
reported that the Stoics call irony a trait of the worthless, and not of the 
sage (Stobaeus II 7.11m 108,12-13 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.630), and it might 
be thought that they are thereby disparaging the irony that is prominent in 
Plato's portrait of Socrates.  This is not the case.  The standard Greek 
meaning of "being ironical" (eirôneuesthai) is deception, and the Stoics can 
reject deception without disparaging Socratic irony, which gently mocks and 
riddles without intending to deceive.  In fact, the Stoics had better not be 
disparaging Socratic irony, since their paradoxes preserve a measure of it: 
the paradoxes are gently mocking expressions—"only the sage is rich," after 
all—that pose riddles without being intended to deceive.   
 There are real disagreements with Socrates, though.  First, according 
to the standard picture, Socrates worked in the agora, out in the open, and 
was willing to question anyone, Athenian or foreigner, young or old.  Stoic 
response to this was complex.  On the one hand, Socrates' openness to 
examining all sorts of people shows a love of humanity (cf. Plato, Eu. 3d), 
and the Stoics embrace Socrates' cosmopolitan commitment to benefiting 
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(that is, examining) foreigners alongside compatriots.  In On Lives, for 
example, Chrysippus suggests that the sage will engage in politics if 
circumstances permit, but that he will not limit himself to politics in his 
homeland if he can better serve human beings abroad as a political advisor 
(see Brown forthcoming: chp. 7).  Later Stoics Musonius (fr. 9 [That Exile is 
no Evil] 42,1-2 Hense = Stobaeus III 40.9 749,2-3 Hense) and Epictetus 
(Diss. I 9.1) and the Stoicizing Tusculan Disputations of Cicero (V 108) and 
De Exilio of Plutarch (600f-601a) make the Socratic provenance of this 
cosmopolitanism explicit.  On the other hand, Socrates' willingness to 
examine anyone reflects the assumption that dialectical examinations pose 
no significant risks, and the Stoics reject this as reckless.  Like Plato (Rep. 
537e-539a), who thinks that dialectic is too dangerous to be shared with the 
young, Chrysippus recommends that teachers of Stoic philosophy exercise 
caution in introducing opposing points of view (Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1036d-
e).  The underlying thought seems to be that young people are so easily 
misled that they should not be exposed to full philosophical activity at a 
young age.  But this disagreement with Socrates is readily explained by 
reflection on Socrates' life.  The fate of Socrates and some of his followers 
should be enough to cause one to rethink the wisdom of fully extending 
philosophical activity to the young.  Here the Stoics are disagreeing with 
Socrates, but respecting some lessons of his life. 
Second, Socrates lived as though philosophy is a special kind of 
career, exclusive of other careers like cobblery and ordinary politics.  
Socrates' philosophical life is not a life of withdrawn contemplation as it is for 
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus—indeed, it is, according to Plato's Gorgias 
(521d), engaged in politics—but it is, like the contemplative life, separate 
from other possible careers.  Stoics reject this feature of the Socratic way of 
life, too, for they insist that living philosophically is compatible with any 
situation in life.  As I have already noted, Stoics think that even a chattel 
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slave can and should philosophize.  This disagreement, too, might well be 
rooted in reflection on Socrates' way of life, and indeed, this one might 
extract from Socrates' life a commitment that is not evident in the way he 
separates himself from other careers.  For Socrates himself dedicates 
himself full-time to dialectical examinations, he was willing to examine 
cobblers and the like, in the hope that a cobbler might know more than he 
about the most important matters.  So although Socrates' way of life by 
itself suggests a special career apart from the need to make money, the way 
he extends his mission might suggest the different, Stoic picture.       
Finally, on the standard account, Socrates had a narrow conception of 
the important matters that one must examine.  He ignored not just the 
question about what knowledge is but also questions about the natural world 
(Plato, Ap. 19b-d; Xenophon, Mem. I 1.11-16; Aristotle, Metaph. A 6 987b1-
2; etc.).  Many Stoics, including the early heads of the school, rejected this; 
they held that one needed to understand the way the natural world is to 
have knowledge, i.e., psychological coherence.  On their view, physics, logic, 
and ethics are unified just as justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom are.   
But here, too, we have a disagreement with Socrates that shows deep 
engagement with him.  First, there were Stoics, especially Ariston of Chios, 
who opposed the teaching of the scholarchs.  Ariston rejected the study of 
the natural world in Socratic terms by saying that it is beyond us human 
beings (D.L. VI 103 and VII 160; Seneca, Ep. 89.13 and 94.2; Sextus, M. 
VII 12; Stobaeus II 1.24 8,13-18 Wachsmuth).  Second, at least one of the 
scholarchs insisted that Socrates did have cosmological views.  Zeno of 
Citium evidently connected the basic doctrines of Stoic cosmology to 
Socrates by relying on the one portrait of Socrates displaying views about 
the nature of the cosmos (Xenophon, Mem. I 4.5-18 and IV 3.2-18; see 
Cicero, N.D. II 18 and Sextus, M. IX 101 with DeFilippo and Mitsis 1994).  
So the Stoics disagree about whether any of them are disagreeing with 
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Socrates.  Their contest over whether the good life requires knowledge of 
the cosmos is also a contest over who Socrates was, and this vividly exhibits 
in one small part the development of Stoicism out of reflection on Socrates' 
way of life.     
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